(ase 4:07-cv-03255-SBA	Document 86	Filed 03/05/2008	Page 1 of 14	
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11	Management, Inc., The Spa				
12	IN T	THE UNITED STA	ATED DISTRICT CO	URT	
13	FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA				
14	National Fair Housing Allia	ance, Inc., et al.,) CASE NO. C	07-03255-SBA	
15	Plain	tiffs,		PROPOSED] ORDER	
16	vs.) CONSTRUCT	A.G. SPANOS FION, INC.; A.G.	
17	A.G. Spanos Construction,	Inc., et al.		VELOPMENT, INC.; S LAND COMPANY, PANOS	
18	Defer	ndants.) MANAGEMI	ENT, INC., AND THE RPORATION'S MOTION	
19			TO DISMISS	PLAINTIFFS' FIRST COMPLAINT FOR	
20				O JOIN NECESSARY ENSABLE PARTIES	
21			[Fed. R. Civ.	P., Rules 12(b)(7) & 19]]	
22				March 11, 2008	
2324			Time: Dept.:	1:00 p.m. Courtroom 3	
25			Complaint File	ed: June 20, 2007	
26	The motion of Defendants A.G. Spanos Construction, Inc., A.G. Spanos				
27	Development, Inc., A.G. Spanos Land Company, Inc., A.G. Spanos Management, Inc., and				
28	The Spanos Corporation, appearing through counsel, for an order dismissing Plaintiffs' first				
	AMENDED [PROPOSED] ORDE		1 ENDANTS' MOTION TO	DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' FIRST	

BACKGROUND				
Spanos Defendants, and Michael Allen appeared on behalf of Plaintiffs.				
Armstrong presiding. Thomas H. Keeling and Lee Roy Pierce, Jr. appeared on behalf of the				
located at 1301 Clay Street, 3 rd Floor, Oakland, California, the Honorable Saundra Brown				
for hearing on March 11, 2008, at 1:00 p.m., in Courtroom 3 of the above-entitled court,				
amended complaint for failure to join necessary and indispensable parties, came on regularly				

ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT

AND MATTERS SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL NOTICE

A. Parties.

Plaintiffs are: (1) the National Fair Housing Alliance, a non-profit entity with its principal place of business in Washington, D.C.; (2) Fair Housing of Marin, "a non-profit community organization located in San Rafael, California;" (3) Fair Housing of Napa Valley, "a non-profit community organization located in Napa, California;" (4) Metro Fair Housing Services, "a non-profit community organization located in Atlanta, Georgia;" and (5) The Fair Housing Continuum, a "non-profit organization committed to equal housing opportunity and the elimination of discrimination in Florida." First Amended Complaint ("FAC") ¶¶ 1, 15-19.

Plaintiffs' alleged "missions" include advocating for the rights of people with disabilities to accessible housing, promoting equal housing opportunities, and eliminating housing and lending inequities. FAC, ¶¶ 15-18.

Defendants A.G. Spanos Construction, Inc., A.G. Spanos Development, Inc., A.G. Spanos Land Company, Inc., A.G. Spanos Management, Inc., and The Spanos Corporation are California corporations with principal offices in Stockton. FAC, ¶¶ 20-25.

Plaintiffs allege that the Spanos Defendants "no longer own most of the "known" and "unknown" apartment complexes for which relief is requested." FAC ¶ 30. They also allege the existence of a <u>defendant class</u> consisting of "current owners of non-compliant [apartment] units." FAC, ¶ 30. Plaintiffs allege that <u>all</u> current owners are "necessary parties in order to effectuate any judgment or order for injunctive relief requested by Plaintiffs." FAC, ¶ 30.

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Plaintiffs sue Knickerbocker Properties, Inc. XXXVIII and Highpointe Village, L.P. "individually and as representatives of [the putative "known" and "unknown" current owner]

class." FAC, ¶ 32. Knickerbocker Properties, Inc. XXXVIII is alleged to own two apartment

complexes: "Mountain Shadows" and "The Commons." FAC, ¶ 33. Highpointe Village, L.P. is alleged to be the owner of Highpointe Village, in Kansas. FAC, ¶ 34.

В. Allegations of Non-Compliance with the FHAA.

Plaintiffs are five organizations located in three states. They allege that 82¹ apartment complexes located in 10 states, allegedly designed and constructed by the Spanos Defendants between 1991 and 2007, do not comply with requirements of the Fair Housing Amendments Act ("FHAA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601, et. seq. They make the same claim with respect to an unknown number of unidentified properties located, presumably, throughout the United States in unspecified locations. The Subject Properties allegedly contain over 22,000 apartment units. Plaintiffs seek an injunction commanding defendants to rebuild the Subject Properties to conform to the FHAA.

More specifically, Plaintiffs allege that the Spanos Defendants "have been involved in the design and construction of approximately [82] multifamily complexes in California, Nevada, Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Texas, Kansas, North Carolina, Georgia and Florida." FAC, ¶ 27. Plaintiffs claim to have identified 34 apartment complexes in California, Arizona, Nevada, Texas, Kansas, Georgia, and Florida (the "Tested Properties"), totaling more than 10,000 individual apartment dwelling units, that do not meet the accessibility requirements of the FHAA. FAC, ¶¶ 3, 30. No plaintiff alleges it is located in, does business in, or counsels persons in Nevada, Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Texas, Kansas, or North Carolina.

With respect to the Tested Properties, Plaintiffs allege that since 1991 the Spanos Defendants have "engaged in a continuous pattern and practice of discrimination against people

¹ The FAC alleges there are 85 complexes sued on. However, Plaintiffs' opposition restates the number of complexes sued on as 82. Opposition, p. 1, n. 1.

with disabilities" by "designing and/or constructing" apartment complexes that deny full access to and use of the facilities as required under the FHAA. FAC, ¶ 4.

Plaintiffs also allege on information and belief that 49 additional apartment complexes in 10 states which the Spanos Defendants designed or constructed (the "Untested Properties") also violate FHAA accessibility requirements. FAC, ¶ 6 and Appendix A to Complaint. The Spanos Defendants are also alleged to have designed or constructed an unspecified number of additional unidentified apartment complexes located in states not yet known to Plaintiffs. FAC, ¶ 28. The Subject Properties allegedly include over 22,000 individual apartments. FAC, ¶ 80.

Plaintiffs claim to have "identified at least one FHAA violation and, in most cases, multiple violations, at each of the Tested Properties." Based on the alleged frequency and similarity of these violations, Plaintiffs allege "a pervasive pattern and practice of designing and constructing apartment communities in violation of the FHAA accessibility design requirements." FAC, ¶ 45. Alleged FHAA violations at the Tested Properties also include failure to design and construct the public and common areas so that they are readily accessible to and usable by people with disabilities. FAC, $\P\P$ 45-47. As for the Untested Properties, Plaintiffs allege only that they were designed and/or constructed after March, 1991. FAC, ¶

As alleged in the Complaint, no plaintiff is located in the same city or county where the tested apartments sued on are located.²

Alleged "Injury" to Plaintiffs. C.

Plaintiffs allege injury as follows:

As a result of the A.G. Spanos Defendants' actions described above. Plaintiffs have been directly and substantially injured in that they have been frustrated in their missions to

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² Rohnert Park is in Sonoma County, but it is 35 miles from Napa, where Fair Housing of Napa Valley is located. See RJN, Ex. 172. Wesley Chapel in Pasco County, Florida, is 132 miles from Cocoa, Florida, in Brevard County. RJN, Ex. 173. The Spanos defendants filed a lengthy Request For Judicial Notice in support of their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint and Accompanying Motions. Plaintiffs do not oppose this request.

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apartments sued upon are located.

eradicate discrimination in housing, and in carrying out the programs and services they provide, including encouraging integrated living patterns, educating the public about fair housing rights and requirements, educating and working with industry groups on fair housing compliance, providing counseling services to individuals and families looking for housing or affected by discriminatory housing practices and eliminating discriminatory housing practices.

- 73. As outlined above, each Plaintiff has invested considerable time and effort in **educating its respective communities**³ about the importance of accessible housing for people with disabilities, in an attempt to secure compliance by entities involved in the design and construction of covered multifamily dwellings. Each time the A.G. Spanos Defendants designed and constructed covered dwellings that did not comply with the FHA **in one of Plaintiffs' service areas, the A.G. Spanos Defendants frustrated the mission of that Plaintiff,⁴ inasmuch as it served to discourage people with disabilities from living at that dwelling,⁵ and encouraged other entities involved in the design and construction of covered units to disregard their own responsibilities under the FHA.**
- 74. The A.G. Spanos Defendants' continuing discriminatory practices have forced Plaintiffs to divert significant and scarce resources to identify, investigate, and counteract the A.G. Spanos Defendants' discriminatory practices, and such practices have frustrated Plaintiffs' other efforts against discrimination, causing each to suffer concrete and demonstrable injuries.
- 75. Each Plaintiff conducted site visits, investigations, surveys and/or tests at the Tested Properties, resulting in the diversion of its resources in terms of staff time and salaries and travel and incidental expenses that it would not have had to expend were it not for the A.G. Spanos Defendants' violations. FHOM, FHNV, MFHS and FHC each diverted staff time and resources to meet with NFHA staff, receive detailed training concerning the accessibility requirements of the FHA and provide logistical support for NFHA staff. In addition to such support:

a. Plaintiff FHOM conducted site visits and

Plaintiffs allege that they are located in Washington, D.C., California, Georgia and Florida. In referring to their "respective communities," plaintiffs cannot be referring to citizens of Nevada, Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, and Kansas, where many of the

⁴ None of the apartments sued upon is located in any of plaintiffs' "respective communities" or in any of Plaintiffs' "service areas." RJN, Exs. 171, 172 and 173.

⁵ Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to identify any disabled person who was so discouraged.

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investigations at Mountain Shadows and Windsor at Redwood Creek, two properties within its service area.

b. Plaintiff FHNV conducted a site visit and investigation at Hawthorn Village, a property within its service area.

- c. Plaintiff MFHS conducted a site visit and investigation at Battery at Chamblee, a property within its service area.
- d. Plaintiff FHC conducted tests at Delano and Arlington at Northwood, two properties within its service area.

FAC, ¶¶ 72-75.

D. Relief Sought by Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs request declaratory and injunctive relief. Among other things, the requested injunctive relief would require the Spanos Defendants to survey all the apartment complexes they constructed throughout the United States since March 13, 1991 and to bring each and every allegedly non-FHAA compliant complex into compliance. FAC, pp. 39-40. Plaintiffs request attorneys' fees and costs, compensatory damages, and punitive damages. FAC, pp. 40-41.

Plaintiffs also seek an order "[e]njoining the Owner Defendants from failing or refusing to permit the retrofits ordered by the Court to be made in their respective properties, to comply with such procedures for inspection and certification of the retrofits performed as may be ordered by this Court, and to perform or allow such other acts as may be necessary to effectuate any judgment against the A.G. Spanos Defendants." FAC, p. 40.

E. Further Description of the Complaint.

The Complaint does not allege that any of the Plaintiffs, any of their members, or any disabled persons ever attempted to rent an apartment at any of the Subject Properties or that any of the Plaintiffs or their members or any disabled person ever intends to do so.

Plaintiffs do not allege that any member of a protected class under the FHAA has encountered discriminatory conduct at any of the Subject Properties. Nor do Plaintiffs claim they are suing on behalf of any member of a protected class.

Plaintiffs do not allege that they have counseled, spoken to, or otherwise expended any resources in communicating with any member of a protected class who claims to have encountered non-FHAA compliant features in any of the Subject Properties.

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Plaintiffs do not allege that any of their "testers" was handicapped. None of the alleged "testers" is named as a plaintiff or identified in the Complaint.

Plaintiffs do not allege facts purporting to show how community organizations with local "service areas" in California, Florida, Georgia, or Washington D.C. were injured by allegedly non-compliant apartment complexes located in New Mexico, Nevada, Arizona, Colorado, Texas, Kansas, and North Carolina.

Plaintiffs do not allege that the putative class defendants have violated the FHAA. Plaintiffs do not allege that the putative class defendants caused any injury to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs do not join as parties any of the tenants who hold leases on the alleged 22,000 units Plaintiffs seek to have rebuilt. Plaintiffs do not join as parties any of the lenders who hold security interests in any of the apartment complexes sued on.

F. Matter Subject to Judicial Notice.

As a matter of public record subject to judicial notice, not one of the 82 Subject Properties is owned by defendants A.G. Spanos Development, Inc., A.G. Land Company, Inc. or A.G. Spanos Management, Inc. RJN, Exs. 1-85. Only one of the Untested Properties—located in Kansas—is owned by defendant A.G. Spanos Construction, Inc. RJN, Ex. 48. Only one of the Untested Properties and two of the Tested Properties are owned by defendant The Spanos Corporation. RJN Exs. 14, 20 and 44. The remaining 51 Untested Properties, and 30 of the Tested Properties, are owned by entities other than the Spanos Defendants. RJN, Exs. 1-85.

All but seventeen of the 82 identified properties sued on were built (and certificates of occupancy issued) more than two years before the Complaint was filed. See RJN, Exs. 127, 128, 166, 133, 91, 94, 100, 103, 99, 105, 125, 126, 129, 134a, 161, 166 and 153. The seventeen exceptions are: (1) The Alexander at the Perimeter, located in Atlanta, Georgia; (2) The Alexander at the District, located in Atlanta, Georgia; (3) Monterra, located in Las Colinas, Texas; (4) Corbin Crossing, located in Overland, Kansas; (5) Tamarron, located in Phoenix, Arizona; (6) Park Crossing, located in Fairfield, California; (7) Stone Canyon, located in Riverside, California; (8) Windsor at Redwood Creek, located in Rohnert Park,

1	California; (9) Ashgrove Place, located in Rancho Cordova, California; (10) Sycamore
2	Terrace, located in Sacramento, California; (11) Arlington at Northwood, located in Wesley
3	Chapel, Florida; (12) Delano at Cypress Creek, located in Wesley Chapel, Florida; (13) The
4	Battery at Chamblee, located in Chamblee, Georgia; (14) The Highlands, located in Chamblee,
5	Georgia; (15) Belterra, located in Fort Worth, Texas; (16) Cheval, located in Houston, Texas;
6	and (17) Auberry at Twin Creeks, located in Allen Texas. See RJN, Exs. 127, 128, 166, 133,
7	91, 94, 100, 103, 99, 105, 125, 126, 129, 134a, 161, 166 and 153.
8	The last certificate of occupancy for Mountain Shadows was issued on September 5,
9	2002, and for "The Commons" on July 18, 2002, more than two years before Plaintiffs filed
10	this complaint. See RJN, ¶¶ 102, 110. The last certificate of occupancy was issued on
11	Highpointe Village on December 8, 2003, more than two years before Plaintiffs filed this
12	complaint. See RJN, ¶ 134.
13	STANDARDS GOVERNING MOTIONS UNDER RULE 12(b)(7)
14	Rule 12(b)(7) permits defendant to challenge a complaint's failure to join "persons
15	whose presence is needed for a just adjudication" under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
16	rule 19.
17	Rule 19(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states, in pertinent part:
18	(1) Required Party. A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of subject-
19	matter jurisdiction must be joined as a party if: (A) in that person's absence, the court cannot accord
20	complete relief among existing parties; or (B) that person claims an interest relating to the subject of
21	the action and is so situated that disposing of the action in the person's absence may:
22	(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect the interest; or
23	(ii) leave an existing party subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise
24	inconsistent obligations because of the interest.
25	A party is considered necessary to an action if "complete relief cannot be granted with
26	the present parties or the absent party has an interest in the disposition of the current
27	proceedings." Laker Airways, Inc. v. British Airways, PLC, 182 F.3d 843, 847 (11th Cir.

Rule 19(b) provides, in pertinent part:

If a person who is required to be joined if feasible cannot be joined, the court must determine whether, in equity and good conscience, the action should proceed among the existing parties or should be dismissed.

Rule 19(b) is the "indispensable" party rule.6

ANALYSIS

I. PLAINTIFFS STATE NO CAUSE OF ACTION BECAUSE THEY HAVE SUED THE WRONG DEFENDANTS.

42 U.S.C. sections 3604(f)(1) and (f)(2) make it "unlawful" to deny a rental to disabled persons, or to deny a rental to those associated with disabled persons. It is landlords - not builders - who are in a position to deny rentals:

The "failure to design and construct" language of 3604(f)(3)(C) might be thought to limit the targets of this provision to those who 'design' or 'construct' covered multi-family dwellings, but this interpretation seems wrong. As one court has observed, 3604(f)(3)(C) "is not a description of who is liable. Rather, it is a description of what actions constitute discrimination."

R. Schwemm, "Barriers to Accessible Housing: Enforcement Issues in Design and Construction Cases under the Fair Housing Act, 40 U. Richmond L.Rev. 753, 776 (2006).

"The conduct and decision-making that Congress sought to affect [by passage of the FHAA] was that of persons in a position to frustrate . . . the housing choices of handicapped individuals who seek to buy or lease housing . . . [P]rimarily . . . those who own the property of choice and their representatives." *Growth Horizons, Inc. v. Delaware County*, 983 F.2d 1277, 1283 (3d Cir. 1993). The Ninth Circuit explained this limitation on potentially liable parties in an ADA case as follows:

[A]fter the noncompliant building has already been built, injunctive relief is only meaningful against the person currently in control of the building. That is, the architect who built the building is by the time of suit by an eligible plaintiff out of the picture. This limitation on relief suggests that reading Title III to make architects, and others who do not own, lease, or operate buildings, such as builders and construction subcontractors, liable for "design and construct" discrimination would create liability in persons against whom there is no

⁶ The amendments effective December 1, 2007, deleted the "traditional terminology" as being "redundant." Advisory Committee Notes to the 2007 Amendment.

Lonberg v. Sanborn Theatres, 259 F.3d 1029, 2001 U.S.App.LEXIS 17418, at *18 (9th Cir. 2001).

The FAC states no cause of action against the owners of the complexes sued on, yet those owners are indispensable to plaintiffs' claims.

II. THE OWNERS, RENTERS, AND SECURED LENDERS ARE INDISPENSABLE PARTIES REGARDING THE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF SOUGHT IN THE FAC.

Although Plaintiffs' Opposition states they seek mere retrofits, the FAC alleges that plaintiffs seek a general nationwide injunction requiring the Spanos defendants to: "bring each and every . . . apartment community [sued on] into compliance with the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(C), and the applicable regulations." FAC, p.40:11-13. Thus, as pled, the FAC seeks a nationwide injunction requiring the Spanos defendants to redesign and reconstruct all apartment complexes sued on - - tested, untested, and unknown.

The redesign and reconstruction of apartments (as requested in the FAC) necessarily affects the property interests of owners, renters and secured lenders and the privacy interests of renters. Plaintiffs allege, correctly, that <u>all</u> current owners are "necessary parties in order to effectuate any judgment or order for injunctive relief requested by plaintiffs." FAC, ¶ 30. Rule 19(a)(2)(i), <u>fundamental due process</u>, and 42 U.S.C. section 3613(d) require that current owners, renters, and secured lenders of the properties sued upon be given notice and an opportunity to be heard. The current owners are entitled to present evidence to this Court showing that properties owned by them <u>actually comply</u> with the accessability requirements of the FHAA and that no disabled person has ever been harmed by alleged inaccessibility of the subject properties. Yet, Plaintiffs' Opposition admits that this Court does not have personal jurisdiction over these owners.

⁷ In an attempt to circumvent this problem, plaintiffs have alleged the existence of a defendant "owner" class and have named Knickerbocker and Highpointe as class representatives. FAC, ¶¶ 32-37. However, this attempt fails. First, the fact that the claims against both class representatives are time-barred renders them "inadequate" under Rule 23. See discussion, below. It also fails to solve the jurisdictional problem: in the absence of an opt-out mechanism, plaintiffs will have to establish personal jurisdiction as to each current owner. Still, plaintiffs' Opposition argues that there is no need

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to afford due process to these known and unknown owners. Lack of personal jurisdiction over absent class members triggers due process concerns even in plaintiff class actions, in which, typically, no relief is sought against the absent class members and – in any event – the absent class members can "opt out" if they chose not to participate in the lawsuit. See, *Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts*, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985). "Presumably, a defendant class would not present the same problems [as posed in *Shutts*] because, unlike the situation with a plaintiff class, the forum court must have personal jurisdiction over each member of a defendant class." *Whitson v. Heilig-Meyers Furniture, Inc.*, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4312, *49 (N.D. Ala. 1995), emphasis added; see, also, *National Assn. for Mental Health, Inc. v. Califano*, 717 F.2d 1451, 1455 (D.C. Cir. 1983) [affirming district court's order refusing to certify a defendant class where the named representatives would not "fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class" and where the district court did "not have in personam jurisdiction over the class members"].

In response to this case law, plaintiffs argue that Rule 23, and two cases interpreting Rule 23, have abrogated the need to afford "due process" to defendant class members. In reality, neither Rule 23 nor any case so holds. In fact, the main case relied on by Plaintiffs, Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979), explains that class relief is not available where Congress by statute has expressly limited such relief. 442 U.S. at 700. 42 U.S.C. section 3613(d) is such a limiting statute. Section 3613(d) mandates that an injunction which "affects" property rights of owners, tenants, or secured lenders "shall not" issue without first affording notice and an opportunity to be heard to these parties. *Ibid*. Similarly, in *Hansberry v. Lee*, 311 U.S. 32 (1940) (the other case relied on by plaintiffs) the Supreme Court found that due process was not afforded where the putative class representative lacked the motivation to vigorously assert the claims and defenses of the subject class members. 311 U.S. at 27-29. Further, any injunction issued by this court which purports to bind persons or entities over which this court lacks personal jurisdiction would be unenforceable. An injunction against a defendant class is not enforceable by the issuing court against nonresident defendant class members outside the court's jurisdiction. And, in a local enforcement proceeding, due process would dictate that the absent member be able to raise collaterally unique defenses: e.g., that he did not engage in the unlawful practice; that the plaintiff is guilty of laches or unclean hands or is estopped to assert a claim against the defendant; that he has obtained a release of claims from the plaintiff; that he is not a member of the class; or that the class representation was inadequate. See 2 Newberg on Class Actions § 4:49 at pp. 347-348 (2002). And in a local enforcement proceeding, such a defendant could assert the defense that 42 U.S.C. § 3613(d) mandates that no injunction issue which affects his or her rights absent notice and an opportunity to be heard, and that therefore this court's injunction lacked validity.

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⁸ Alternatively, plaintiffs suggest that this court could wait until all 22,000 known apartments are vacated. However, since some tenants live in the same apartments all of their

22,000 tenants own leaseholds - - granting them property and privacy rights to their apartments - - and due process and 42 U.S.C. section 3613(d) require they be given notice and an opportunity to be heard before issuance of an injunction which affects those rights.⁹

And an injunction requiring the redesign and reconstruction of individual units leased by renters <u>also</u> adversely affects the property rights of secured lenders. Plaintiffs' Opposition argues that the "cash flow" of the affected rentals <u>may</u> not be significantly impaired. But the FAC does not so allege, and the injunction sought in the FAC seeks the redesign and reconstruction of each known and unknown complex. As alleged by the FAC, then, the property rights of secured lenders will be affected.

Finally, in equity and "good conscience" this action should not proceed without the owners, renters and secured lenders. Fed.R.Civ.P., rule 19. These parties have property and/or privacy rights which may not be impaired without due process of law - - which, at a minimum - - requires notice and an opportunity to be heard. These due process rights clearly outweigh any concern regarding potential harm to plaintiffs which may result from dismissal of this lawsuit. Plaintiffs' only alleged harm consists of litigation costs voluntarily incurred by Plaintiffs to identify and test the subject properties and thereafter to bring this lawsuit. This monetary harm was voluntarily incurred to manufacture a nationwide lawsuit purportedly brought to benefit the disabled. In reality, dismissal of this lawsuit will not harm disabled persons at all. If any disabled person ever actually visits any of the properties sued on and finds that a failure in design or construction actually impairs his or her access, then a suit under 3604(f)(1) or (f)(2) can be filed. The FHAA allows the appropriate federal district court to "appoint an attorney to represent such person" and waive all "fees, costs, [and] security." 42 U.S.C. § 3613(b)(1) and (2). And, such a disabled person could approach one of the

adult lives, this Court would be supervising such an injunction for 30 or more years.

⁹ See, *H.J.M. v. K. Hovnanian at Mahwah VI, Inc.*, 672 A.2d 1166, 1172 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1996); *Equal Rights Center v. Post Properties, Inc.*, 522 F.Supp.2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2007); see, also, Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(a)(2)(i); *Schneider v. Whaley*, 417 F.Supp. 750, 757 (S.D. NY 1976) (tenants had a "protected interest at stake" in the housing authority's policy-making and were thus entitled to notice and an opportunity to submit evidence and argument).

plaintiff fair housing organizations herein and request assistance with his or her suit.

However, such a future suit is not likely because an actual future denial of access is not likely. Plaintiffs sue nationwide on 82 apartment complexes containing 22,000 units - - and on an unknown number of unknown complexes containing an unknown number of units- - many built more than 15 years ago. Yet, plaintiffs fail to allege that any disabled person has ever in any way actually had his or her access impaired at any of the known or unknown complexes sued on.

The FAC in fact fails to allege that most types of disabled persons <u>could have</u> their access impaired. The design and construction defects alleged in the FAC are irrelevant to the blind, the deaf, the mentally infirm, etc. The alleged defects <u>could possibly</u> affect a mobility-impaired person, depending upon the height, size and weight of that particular person and depending upon the degree of that person's impairment. But, even if such a mobility impaired person's access is denied or impaired in the future, he could file suit in the <u>local</u> district court - and the owner, tenants, and secured lenders would have minimum contacts with the <u>local</u> district court overseeing the suit, as would the Spanos defendants.

In contrast - - although no disabled person has ever been harmed - - Plaintiffs ask this Court to issue and supervise a nationwide injunction requiring the redesign and reconstruction of 22,000 known apartments (and an unknown number of unknown apartments) without notice to the owners, renters and secured lenders. "Equity and good conscience" require that since these parties cannot be joined, this case should be dismissed.

CONCLUSION

Having read and considered the documents submitted in support of and in opposition to the motion and the arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing therefor, the Court rules as follows: Current owners are the principal parties who may be liable regarding the causes of action alleged in the FAC. Moreover, (1) the current owners of the affected properties, as well as the tenants living in the affected properties and the lenders whose loans are secured by the affected properties, are necessary and/or indispensable parties to this action, in which plaintiffs seek, among other things, an injunction requiring the rebuilding of the affected